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Abstract
Changes in risk perception have been used in various contexts to explain shorter-term
developments in ﬁnancial markets, as part of a mechanism that ampliﬁes ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial
markets, as well as in accounts of “irrational exuberance.” This approach holds that changes in risk
perception affect actions undertaken in risky situations, and create a discrepancy between the risk
attitude implied by those actions and the a priori description of risk attitude as summarized by the
Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion. The author characterizes this discrepancy by introducing the
notion of risk perception within the expected utility theory, and proposes the concept of implied
risk aversion as a summary measure of risk attitudes implied by agents’ actions. Properties of
implied risk aversion are related to an individual’s future outlook. Key ideas are illustrated using
an asset-pricing model.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81, D84, G12
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Financial markets
Résumé
Les changements de la perception du risque ont servi à expliquer dans divers contextes l’évolution
à court terme des marchés ﬁnanciers, les phénomènes d’ampliﬁcation des ﬂuctuations sur ces
marchés ainsi que les périodes d’« exubérance irrationnelle ». Selon les tenants de cette approche,
les changements de perception inﬂuencent les actions entreprises en situation risquée, ce qui crée
une divergence entre l’attitude face au risque dénotée par ces actions et celle mesurée a priori par
les coefﬁcients d’aversion pour le risque d’Arrow-Pratt. Pour tenir compte de cette divergence,
l’auteur intègre la notion de perception du risque à la théorie de l’utilité espérée et propose de
mesurer l’attitude qui transparaît implicitement dans les actions des agents au moyen d’un nouvel
indicateur : l’aversion implicite pour le risque. Les propriétés de cet indicateur sont déﬁnies par
les attentes de l’agent concernant l’avenir. Les idées maîtresses de l’étude sont illustrées à l’aide
d’un modèle d’évaluation des actifs.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D81, D84, G12
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Marchés ﬁnanciers1. Introduction
Changes in the future outlook and in risk attitudes may be among practitioners’ more
popular explanations of asset-price movements, but it would certainly be an overstate-
ment to say that these have been enthusiastically embraced in academic circles. There
are signs of change, although these two explanations have fared somewhat differently.
Whereas changes in the future outlook, modelled as changes in expectations, seem to
be increasingly accepted as an explanation of a wide range of phenomena, the status
of changes in risk attitudes seems to be controversial.
1 Practitioners’ regular appeals
to changes in risk attitudes are, perhaps equally regularly, dismissed by academics.
2
The grounds for dismissal are methodological: changes in risk attitudes amount to re-
laxing the assumption of constant preferences, which is thought to safeguard rigour in
research.
3 Furthermore, changes in expectations—through learning, for example—are
thought to be consistent with individual rationality,
4 while changes in risk attitudes are
not.
There seems to be little reason for either this asymmetric treatment or explanatory
dichotomy. The explanatory dichotomy has been breached by the use of changes in in-
1 Recent examples of the use of changes in expectations as explanatory devices include Cecchetti,
Lam, and Mark (2000), Danthine et al. (2003), Kurz (1997, chapter 11), and Melino and Y ang (2003).
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, chapter 8.4) provide a discussion and additional references. For
links to the business cycle literature, see Beaudry and Portier (2004). Misina (2003) discusses some
pitfalls associated with the use of these models.
2 Changingriskaversionisacceptedinthecontextofhabitpersistence; seeCampbell, Lo,andMacKin-
lay (1997, chapter 8.4). However, changes in risk attitude obtained via habit persistence are unlikely to
help explain shorter-term fluctuations, since risk attitudes are related to consumption, a variable that is
quite stable over short periods of time.
3 The key issue is clearly summarized by Arrow (1982): ‘‘A fundamental element of rationality . . . is,
in logicians’ language, that of extensionality. The chosen element depends on the opportunity set from
which the choice is made, independently of how that set is described. . . . The cognitive psychologists
deny that the choice is in fact extensional; the framing of the question affects the answer.’’
4 Here, individual rationality means axiomatic consistency of individual choices, rather than the ques-
tion of how individuals form expectations.
1dividual risk perceptions ina variety of contexts to explain shorter-term developments
infinancialmarkets, aspartofamechanismthatamplifiesfluctuationsinfinancialmar-
kets, and in explanations of ‘‘irrational exuberance.’’
5 This approach holds that changes
in risk perception affect actions undertaken in risky situations, and create a discrepancy
between the risk attitude implied by those actions and the a priori description of risk
attitude summarized by the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion. The problem is to
characterize this discrepancy between implied and a priori risk attitudes, and arrive at a
notion of risk attitude implied by agents’ actions.
The first step in this process is to specify what determines risk perceptions. The
literature on behavioural foundations of choice under uncertainty identifies a number
of factors that influence risk perceptions.
6 Among them, individual future outlook
has been established as an important determinant.
7 In this way, explanations based on
changesinrisk perceptionsrelate anindividual’s future outlooktotheir viewsregarding
risks.
8
Thispaper seeks to introducethe notionof risk perception within the context of the
expected utility theory, while addressing the methodological concerns expressed above.
5 For example, ‘‘the decline in longer-term interest rates and diminished perceptions of credit risk in
recent months have provided a substantial lift to the market value of nearly all major categories of house-
hold assets’’ (Greenspan 2003). For examples related to financial cycles and irrational exuberance, see
Borio (2003) and Shiller (2000, 46), respectively.
6 For example, see Slovic et al. (2002) and references cited therein.
7 See Hirshleifer (2001, 1550–51). For evidence on the relationship between future outlook and prob-
ability assessments, see Wright and Bower (1992). These authors also provide a discussion and further
references regarding the impact of mood on risk assessments. More generally, the issue in this paper is
the status of the extensionality axiom. Considerable evidence, starting with the early identification of
the framing effects, has been accumulated in support of the claim that the extensionality axiom may be
violated. See Tversky and Koehler (1994) for further discussion.
8 I do not investigate the sources of revisions of subjective assessments, although the literature on cog-
nitive psychology identifies a number of patterns: optimistic bias has been well documented (Weinstein
and Klein 2002; Armor and Taylor 2002; and Hirshleifer 2001, 1550–51).








s denotes agent i’s probability of state s, and x represents relevant outcomes.
In this context it is, in principle, straightforward to obtain the necessary links within
the constant risk-aversion class by specifying that the risk-aversion parameter, ½, de-
pends on the individual’s expectations, ¼i=(¼i
1;:::;¼i
S); i.e., ½ = ½(¼i). Assuming
that there are ¾ ‘‘expectations states’’ (i.e., ¼i 2 f¼i
1;:::;¼i
¾g) in this formulation, state-
dependence is modelled through variation of the risk-aversion parameter across these
states.
Thisformulation,whileincorporatinglinksbetweenexpectationsandriskattitudes,
fails to meet the methodological objections raised above: preferences are formally not
constant, but state-dependent. To deal with this objection, the primitive assumption
in the analysis is that the subutility function is state-independent, and belongs to the
constant risk-aversion class:
uj (¢) = uk (¢); 8j;k:
This assumption will, within the class of constant risk-aversion utility functions, guar-
antee that individual risk attitudes are represented by an exogenously specified risk-
aversion parameter. Changes in agent i’s expectations are represented by changes in
their probability distribution over future states, (¼i
1;:::;¼i
S): The difficulty is that, un-
der the assumption of constant subutility, establishing links between the future outlook
and individual risk attitudes seems precluded.
3Toresolve thisproblem, I introduce the notion of impliedrisk aversion, anditscor-
responding coefficient. This coefficient captures the risk attitude implied by individual
actions. Arrow-Pratt coefficients represent the a priori description of risk attitudes. The
discrepancy between the implied risk aversion and constant Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion
coefficients will be due to changing risk perceptions.
Moreover, it is possible to characterize the behaviour of implied risk aversion in
qualitative terms as a function of future outlook. It will be shown that upward revisions
of probabilities of good states are associated with lower implied risk aversion, and up-
ward revisions of probabilities of bad states with increased implied risk aversion. If
upward revisions of probabilities of good states can be interpreted as indicators of op-
timism, and downward revisions as indicators of pessimism, then this framework pro-
vides a description of the interaction between individual disposition towards the future
(optimism, pessimism), individual actions, and risk attitudes implied by those actions.
9
For example, optimism about the future will induce individuals to undertake actions
that would not have been undertaken for a given value of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient.
The attitude towards risk implied by their actions will be captured by the implied risk-
aversion coefficient. In this way, one can capture the anecdotal evidence of investors
who claim that their risk attitudes have not changed but behave as if they have.
10
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the key terms are defined and the
main result is provided relating revisions of probabilities to risk attitudes. In section
3, the results obtained are interpreted in terms of the relationship between investors’
disposition towards the future and risk perceptions. Section 4 illustrates the concepts
9 Optimistic bias is defined as an upward bias in the assignment of probabilities of good states. The
bias is established relative to a benchmark. This issue is discussed further in section 3. See Armor and
Taylor (2002).
10 Stories like this seem particularly frequent in periods of prolonged market upturns, as in the second
half of the 1990s. Shiller (2000) provides detailed evidence.
4by means of an example, using a standard asset-pricing model. Section 5 offers some
conclusions.
2. Probability Beliefs and Risk Aversion
Consider the following setting:
– two states of nature: 1 is good; 2 is bad
– objective probabilities
11 defined over these states: ¼1;¼2
– individual i with utility function
U






s is the subjective probability belief about state s.
Individuals can revise their beliefs about the likelihood of good and bad states in
both directions: upward revisions of the good state, ¼i




likely than is objectively warranted. The problem is to establish the link between these
revisions and risk attitudes, and thus arrive at a formal expression of risk perception.
Individual risk aversion is specified by the subutility function, u(¢): It is assumed
that u(¢) is state-independent, which, in thiscontext, means that the exogenously speci-
fied coefficient of risk aversion does not vary across states. It will be demonstrated that
revisions in individual beliefs have two effects: the effect on expected payoffs, and the
11 I am not, at the moment, interested in the origin of these probabilities.
5effect on risk attitudes via changes in risk perceptions. The latter effect is not captured
by the risk-aversion coefficient, which is assumed to be constant.
A formal statement is given below. The key result is contained in Proposition 2.1.
To get there, several preliminary steps are needed, which are summarized in Lemmas
2.1 and 2.2, and Definition 2.1.
Let S denote the (finite-dimensional) set of possible states of the world, and let
¼ =[¼(s)] denote a probability distribution defined on S. Each state has a payoff as-
sociated with it. Let x = ¼ ¢ x represent the expected payoff, where x =[x(s)]: X is
the space of expected payoffs.
Define S° and S¯ so that S = S° [ S¯; S° \ S¯ = ;; with
s 2 S° iff x(s 2 S°) > x(s = 2 S°):
Inwords,S° isthesetofpayoff-dominantstateswiththeassociatedprobability¼ (s 2 S°) ´
P
s2S° ¼ (s): The probability associated with S¯ is ¼(s 2 S¯) ´
P
s2S¯ ¼(s):





@¼ (s 2 S°)
> 0:
The proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 establishes the relationship between expected payoffs and revisions in
individual assessments of good and bad states, respectively. Under the usual assump-
tionsonthe subutility function, a change in expected payoffsbrought about by a change
in these assessments will result in a change in the level of utility of the expected payoff.
6Anupwardrevisionof theprobabilityof thegoodstatewill leadtoanincreaseintheex-
pectedpayoffandtoanincreaseinthelevelofutilityoftheexpectedpayoff. Tocompare
the initial and the final states, it is necessary to bring the individual back to the original
level of utility. This can be achieved by notionally changing the risk-aversion parame-
ter. The change in the risk-aversion parameter that is necessary to bring the individual
to the original level of utility, after a revision in probabilities, is called the equivalent
variation, denoted EV½:





@¼ (s 2 Ss)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=¹ u;x=x0
; s = ¯;°:
Using this definition, the implied risk aversion, ½¶, can be defined as the value of
the risk-aversion parameter that, after a change in the expected payoff, results in the
original level of utility:
½
¶ ´ ½ + EV½:
The concepts of equivalent variation and implied risk aversion establish the link
between revisions in the probability assessments and risk attitudes. The problem is to
characterize this relationship in qualitative terms. To accomplish this, one more result,
given in the following lemma, is needed.
Lemma 2.2 Letu(¢)denoteadifferentiableutilityfunctionoftheconstantrisk-aversion




The proof is provided in the appendix.
7Thislemmacharacterizestherelationshipbetweenchangesinriskaversionandthe
level of utility. The result holds for the class of constant risk-aversion utility functions
(both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion).
These results enable me to characterize the relationship between revisions in prob-
ability assessments and risk attitudes. This is the content of the following proposition.














¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=¹ u;x=x0
< 0:
The proof is provided in the appendix.
This proposition characterizes the relationship between changes in payoffs due to
revisions in probability assessments and equivalent variation. The relationship between
the two is inverse: an increase in the probability of a bad state will result in an increase
in EV½: Similarly, an increase in the probability of a good state will result in a decrease
in EV½.
The effect of revisions in probabilities on implied risk aversion follows directly














8The proof follows directly from the main proposition and the definition of implied
risk aversion.




The concept of implied risk aversion allows for the possibility that risk attitudes
implied by individual actions when their future outlook changes diverge from the ex-
ogenously specified risk attitudes, summarized by the Arrow-Pratt measure. This dis-
crepancyisduetochangesinriskperceptions,capturedbytheEV½ term. Thisisaccom-
plished without formally relaxing the assumption of constant preferences, understood
as the state-independent subutility function, u(¢).
12
3. Disposition towards the Future and Risk Perception
The results of section 2 can be given a more precise interpretation by examining more
closely the revisions of individual assessments discussed there. The objective is not to
relate revisions to a particular underlying cause, but to suggest that the revisions inves-
tigated above are consistent with the notions of optimism and pessimism. Optimism is
a state in which an individual assigns a greater probability to the good state than the one
implied by some objective measure. The key feature of optimism is that an individual
overestimatestheprobabilityof agoodstate. Pessimismmanifestsitself inoverestimat-
12 The assumption of extensionality of choices is implicitly relaxed here. Alternative descriptions of
the same event are assumed to influence individual probability assessments and thus lead to different
judgments. See Tversky and Koehler (1994, 548).
9ing the probability of a bad state. States of optimism and pessimism are jointly referred
to as a ‘‘disposition towards the future.’’
To make these notions operational, one needs to define the term ‘‘normal state.’’
This can be done in two ways:
– by specifying a benchmark, or
– by comparison with a previous state.
It is important to distinguish between these two methods. By defining disposition
towardsthefuturerelativetoabenchmark, itispossibletofocusontrendsindisposition
changes. Definitionsrelatingthecurrentstatetoapreviousstatecapturesmallvariations
indisposition, butmayobstructtheidentificationof trends. Inthe followingdiscussion,
the definitions will be established relative to a benchmark.
13
Individual i is said to be optimistic if
¼
i (s 2 S°) > ¼(s 2 S°);
where ¼(s 2 S°) is the probability of a good state associated with some benchmark.
In models that rely on the assumption of rational expectations, the benchmark is rep-
resented by the equilibrium process. In practical applications, the benchmark can be
taken as the relative frequency of visiting a particular state obtained from past data.
14
13 Whereas the construction of the benchmark is outside the scope of this paper, a natural candidate is
the stationary measure based on the restrictions on individual beliefs. See Kurz (1997, Introduction) for
an exposition of the basic ideas.
14 This allows for the possibility of extreme events. One could think of a bad event, the frequency of
which in past data is zero. An individual would be said to display pessimism if they assign a positive
probability to that event.
10Individual i is said to be pessimistic if
¼
i (s 2 S¯) > ¼(s 2 S¯):
In words, individuals are said to display optimism (pessimism) if they overweigh
the probability of good (bad) states.
These definitions, in conjunction with the results of section 2, enable me to estab-
lishpreciselinksbetweenadispositiontowardsthefutureandriskperceptions. Changes
in disposition towards the future affect agents’ actions by affecting the way they per-
ceive risks. Optimism implies lower risk perception, whereas pessimism implies that a
given situation will be perceived as riskier than before.
The implications for individual behaviour are immediate. In situations where in-
dividuals are optimistic, they undertake actions that they would not usually undertake.
They tend to downplay the risks associated with particular types of assets, and do not
demand the risk premium that they usually would. This opens the possibility of bid-
ding up the prices of assets. Similarly, when individuals are pessimistic, they demand
higher risk premiums. They perceive most assets as riskier than usual and may decide
to withhold their investment funds.
In the above framework, changes in risk attitudes due to changes in disposition
towards the future are captured by the implied risk-aversion coefficient. Changes in
risk perceptions will have an impact on individual actions, even when the risk-aversion
coefficientintheutilityfunctionisunchanged. Itfollowsthatriskperceptionsmayhave
an important role to play in explaining individual behaviour in dynamic settings.
Theaboveanalysisdoesnotimplythatchangesinriskperceptionswillnecessarilly
lead to ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ or similar events. I do not analyze the factors leading to
11exuberance.
15 My analysis demonstrates that these phenomena can be captured within
the standard framework, and that the role of risk perceptions may have been underem-
phasized.
4. Risk Perceptions and Asset Prices
This section illustrates the relationship between changes in disposition towards the fu-
ture, risk perceptions, and price behaviour.
4.1 Model
A standard consumption-based asset-pricing model is used, with a representative agent
in an exchange economy that has a single consumption good. I focus on analyzing the






The only source of uncertainty is the time-varying nature of the risky asset’s payoffs.
It is assumed that there are two possible states of the world (st = f1;0g; good and
bad), and that dh and dl are dividend payments of this asset associated with each state,
respectively. Dividends at each date are selected according to the following rule:
dt =
½
dh if st = 1
dl if st = 0 :
The future state is drawn so that Pr(st = 1) = Pr(st = 0) = 0:5: One can interpret
these as the unconditional probabilities of the two states. The associated transition ma-









To isolate the effect of changes in the future outlook on asset prices, it is assumed that
consumption grows at a known constant but positive rate, gc. With these assumptions,














4.1.1 Agents’ disposition towards the future
Agents form beliefs about future dividend payments and this affects their current de-
mand for equity. For simplicity, it is assumed that agents know the unconditional state
probabilities. They have at their disposal past data and are trying to infer something
about the future. At each point in time, they decide whether to revise their future out-
lookupwardsordownwards, or toleaveitunchanged. Thedecisiontakencanberelated
to some well-documented attitudes in the literature on psychology, such as overreaction
and conservatism.
16 Revisions in any direction will have an impact on asset prices.
4.1.2 Computation of expected returns
The expected returns at any point in time are computed using the expression:
R(st+1 = i) =
p(st+1 = i) + d(st+1 = i)
p(st = i)
;
16 Revisions of the future outlook could be due to new information, or to a different interpretation of ex-
isting information. While the underlying motives are taken as exogenous here, the mechanism is general
enough to accommodate either of the causes.
13for expected returns if the future state is unchanged, and
R(st+1 = j) =
p(st+1 = j) + d(st+1 = j)
p(st = i)
;
if the future state changes. The expected returns at time t are
R
ex
t+1 = ¼ (st+1 = ijst = i)R(st+1 = i) + ¼ (st+1 = jjst = i)R(st+1 = j):
Equivalent formulas apply when st = j:
4.1.3 Computation of implied risk aversion
Thebenchmarkvalueoftherisk-aversionparameteristakentobeanexogenouslygiven
value, which is assumed to be related to the risk attitude when states are generated
according to (1). The associated level of utility is the benchmark level of utility, ¹ u:
Revisions of the future outlook result in changes in expected payoffs. For the new
value of expected payoffs, the implied risk aversion is the value of the risk-aversion
parameter that would yield the original level of utility.
4.1.4 Parameter values
Thepurposeisnottomatchparticularpropertiesofthedata,buttoinvestigatetheimpact
of changes in the future outlook on asset prices. The process generating the states is
assumed to be (1). Other parameter values are as follows:
½ = 3; ¯ = 0:95; (d1;d2) = (2;0); gc = 1:01:
144.2 Results
Consider a case in which the agent has recently observed a realization of the following
states: f1;1;1g: The question is whether this will lead the agent to revise their future
outlook. There are three possibilities, corresponding to different investment styles.
Case 1: No revisions of the agent’s future outlook
The agent does not attach any significance to the fact that the last three periods
were good states. The agent believes that the process generating states is a coin toss
with equal probabilities, and that this process does not preclude the possibility of a
sequence of three good states. Indeed, the probability of getting three good states in a
row under the postulated process is 12.5 per cent. As a consequence of this reasoning,
the agent does not revise their future outlook. This reasoning would correspond to a
conservative strategy, which discounts the most recent realizations. The price in period
4 remains the same. The implied risk aversion is unchanged.
Case 2: Upward revisions
Theagentbelievesthatasequenceofthreegoodstatesisasignofapossibleregime
change. Theagentalsobelievesthattheprobabilitiesassignedbythepostulatedprocess
are too low, and revises the probability of a future state upwards. The agent is more
confident than warranted by past data that the good state will be realized tomorrow, and
displays optimism. The implied risk aversion decreases, even though the Arrow-Pratt
measure of risk aversion remains the same. The investment outlook is perceived as less
risky, and the agent invests, putting upward pressure on the price.





















 Price - exuberance
 Price - cautious optimism
 Implied risk aversion - exuberance





Figure 1 illustrates two cases, termed cautious optimism and exuberance. In the
case of cautious optimism, the agent revises their future outlook upwards, but in a grad-
ual fashion. The probability of a future good state is revised from ¼11 = 0:5 in period
3 to ¼11 = 0:61 in period 4. The unconditional probability assigned to the good state
increases from 0:5 in period 3 to 0.63 in period 6, as implied risk aversion decreases.
This leads to a total increase in price of approximately 27 per cent.
In the case of exuberance, the initial revision is from ¼11 = 0:5 in period 3 to
¼11 = 0:81 in period 4. The unconditional probability of the good state is revised from
0:5 in period 3 to 0:92 in period 6. Moreover, the agent considers that the continuation
of the good state is virtually certain and sets ¼11 = 0:96 in period 6. This leads to a
dramatic increase in prices of approximately86 per cent. Implied risk aversiondeclines
more than in the case of cautious optimism.
16Case 3: Downward revisions
The agent believes that it ishighlyunlikelythat the goodtimeswill continue. They
consider the three consecutive good states to be ‘‘too good to be true’’ and consequently
revise their future outlook downwards. The agent displays pessimism relative to the
postulated process. As a consequence, the investments are perceived as more risky
than before and the agent will decide to sell, or demand a higher expected return, to be
compensated for the higher perceived risk. The agent’s implied risk aversion increases.
















 Price - gloom
 Price - depression
 Implied risk aversion - gloom




Figure2illustratestwocases, termedgloomanddepression. Ineachcase, theagent
believes that the present state is unlikely to continue, and this is reflected in downward
revisions of the probability of the good state. In the case of gloom, the unconditional
probability of a bad state increases from 0:5 in period 3 to 0:63 in period 6, whereas the
17probability of staying in a bad state once there increases from 0:5 to 0:71. This leads to
a decline in price of approximately 37 per cent as the implied risk aversion increases.
In the case of depression, the results are more dramatic: the unconditional prob-
ability of the bad state is set to 0:84 in period 6, and the probability of remaining in
the bad state is 0:91: This results in a drop in price of approximately 70 per cent as the
implied risk aversion increases.
4.3 Comments
Theforegoingexamplesillustratethelinksbetweenchangesinfutureoutlookandasset-
price movements. A great variety of patterns can be produced in this way. Persistent
optimism can create upward movements in asset prices, whereas persistent pessimism
will create downward movements. This effect is well known as bull and bear markets,
but it is important to emphasize that the above results are obtained through changes
in risk perceptions. The same series of events can be perceived differently at different
points in time, and this gives rise to changing attitudes towards risk. This effect is not
captured by either the constant risk-aversion class of utility functions or the class of
utility functions that relies on habit persistence.
5. Conclusions
In this work, I have provided a formal description of changes in risk perceptions, which
bridges the gap between explanations based on changes in expectations and those that
are based on changes in risk attitudes. The concept of equivalent variation was intro-
ducedasa representation of riskperception, and the notion of implied riskaversion was
introduced to capture the discrepancy between an exogenosuly specified Arrow-Pratt
18measure of risk attitudes and the risk attitudes implied by agents’ actions when their
risk perceptions change.
Although there are similarities between this approach and the approach that relies
on a state-dependent risk-aversion parameter, I believe that the approach proposed in
this paper has some advantages over the former: state-dependency does not in itself
offer any explanation of reasons for a change in investors’ risk attitudes. Under the
proposed approach, there is a direct link between revisions of subjective probability as-
sessmentsandriskperceptions. Whilethislinkcanbeinterpretedintermsofdisposition
towardsthefuture, andintermsof risk perceptions, thisinterpretationisnot exhaustive.
Indeed, one could interpret revisions in probability assessments as a way of capturing
violationsof the extensionalityaxiom, regardlessof theunderlyingcause. The interpre-
tationproposed in this paper relies on the observation that optimistic individualstend to
downplay risks, whereas pessimism often leads to extreme caution and overweighing
of risks. While there issome empirical support for this type of interpretation, the results
do not depend on it.
Furthermore, the approach that relies on state-dependent risk aversion does not
allow for the discrepancy between a priori specified risk attitudes and the risk attitudes
implied by agents’ actions. As such, that approach does not allow for a distinction
between risk perceptions and risk attitudes, which is the key aspect of the framework
proposed in this paper.
In my analysis, no assumptions were made regarding the reasons for revisions of
individual probability assessments. Several possibilities come to mind, all of whichcan
be accommodated within the proposed framework:
– the absence of an objective standard for determining the impact of current news on
19future prospects,
– framing effects, or some other underlying cognitive biases, and
– learning limitations. Agents do not believe that what they learn from past data is the
correct statistical data-generating process. Among the possible reasons for this are
structural uncertainty, or cognitive biases.
Regardless of the underlying causes, the example provided in section 4 suggests
that the impact on asset prices depends on the extent of these revisions. The exam-
ple does not specify the mechanics of revisions, but one could use Bayesian updating
at least as a benchmark and then investigate the implications for asset prices.
17 Al-
ternatively, rather than specifying the revision mechanism, one could impose a priori
restrictions onthe extent of admissible revisions, given the past history of the data, asin
Kurz (1997). Whereas different learning mechanisms may have different quantitative
implications for the asset-price movements, the basic relationship between disposition
towards the future, risk perceptions, and asset-price movements analyzed in this work
remains intact.
17 This learning procedure might be of limited use, however, in environments where complete learning
is precluded.
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22Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1:
Let ¼ ´ [¼(s 2 S¯);¼ (s 2 S°)]; and x ´ [x(s 2 S¯);x(s 2 S°)]; so that
x =
£















@¼ (s 2 S¯)
= x(s 2 S¯) ¡ x(s 2 S°)
< 0:
The proof of the second part follows from the above.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2:
Case 1: Constant relative risk aversion












This is a second-order Euler differential equation. The solution guess takes the form





r¡1[r(r ¡ 1) + ½r] = 0;
which implies that
r
2 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)r = 0;
so that
r1 = 0; r2 = (1 ¡ ½):
The solution then takes the form
u = c1x
1¡½ + c2:








> 0 if lnx > 0 ) x > 1:
If the constant c2 = ¡1; x > 1 guarantees a well-behaved utility function. Other
properties of utility functions are used to restrict parameter values for c1:
Case 2: Constant absolute risk aversion
Starting from the definition of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion RA =
¡u00







0 = 0: (3)
The solution to this differential equation is standard. The solution guess takes the form








r1 = 0; r2 = ¡½:











> 0 if c1 < 0:
Condition c1 < 0 is needed in order for the utility function to be well-behaved.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1:
From u ´ u(x(¼);½(¼)); we have
du











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=¹ u
; s = ¯;°:
u = ¹ u (by assumption) implies that du










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=¹ u
; s = ¯;°:
Given that @u
@x > 0 (positive marginal utility) and @u
@½ > 0 (Lemma 2.2), it follows that
@½
@¼ (s 2 Ss)
> 0 when s = ¯;
since, by Lemma 2.1, @x
@¼(s2S¯) < 0. Similarly,
@½
@¼ (s 2 Ss)
< 0 when s = °;
since, by Lemma 2.1, @x
@¼(s2S°) > 0:
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